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correct answer: 15 out of 315 (i.e., 5%). 
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Communicating Statistical 
Information 
Ulrich Hoffrage,* Samuel Lindsey, Ralph Hertwig, Gerd Gigerenzer 
ecisions based on statistical infor- 
mation can mean the difference be- 
tween life and death-for instance, 
when a cancer patient has to decide 
whether to undergo a painful medical pro- 
cedure based on the likelihood that it will 
succeed, or when a jury has to decide 
whether to convict someone based on 
DNA evidence. Unfortunately, most of us, 
experts included, have difficulty under- 
standing and combining statistical infor- 
mation effectively. 
For example, faculty, staff, and students 
at Harvard Medical School were asked to 
estimate the probability of a disease given 
the following information (1): "If a test to 
detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 
has a false positive rate of 5 per cent, what 
is the chance that a person found to have a 
positive result actually has the disease, as- 
suming that you know nothing about the 
person's symptoms or signs?" The esti- 
mates varied wildly, ranging from the most 
frequent estimate, 95% (given by 27 out of 
60 participants), to the correct answer, 2% 
(given by 11 out of 60 participants) (2). In a 
study requiring interpretation of mammog- 
raphy outcomes (3), almost all physicians 
confused the sensitivity of the test (the pro- 
portion of positive test results among peo- 
ple with the disease) with its positive pre- 
dictive value (the proportion of people with 
the disease among those who receive a pos- 
itive test result). This is a common confu- 
sion that even crops up in scholarly articles 
(3) and statistical textbooks (4) and certain- 
ly affects the ability of lay people (5) to un- 
derstand the statistical information. Recent 
discussions of genetic testing have indicat- 
ed that genetic counselors are experiencing 
the same difficulty (6). 
It makes little mathematical difference 
whether statistics are expressed as proba- 
bilities, percentages, or absolute frequen- 
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people make statistical inferences, proba- 
bilities apparently hinder them. Unfortu- 
nately, in contexts in which the positive 
predictive value of a test is at issue, statis- 
tics are typically expressed and communi- 
cated in the form of probabilities, although 
they can easily be translated into natural 
frequencies, as follows: 
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Fig. 1. Interpreting statistics. Medical students' 
rect inferences in four realistic diagnostic tasks. 
cies. It does, however, make a psychologi- 
cal difference. More specifically, statistics 
expressed as natural frequencies improve 
the statistical thinking of experts and non- 
experts alike. 
Natural Frequencies 
To illustrate how natural frequencies differ 
from probabilities, we use .the example of a 
cancer screening test. The probability of col- 
orectal cancer can be 
given as 0.3% [base 
rate]. If a person has 
colorectal cancer, the 
probability that the 
hemoccult test is posi- 
tive is 50% [sensitivi- 
ty]. If a person does not 
have colorectal cancer, 
the probability that he 
still tests positive is 3% 
[false-positive rate]. 
What is the probability 
that a person who tests 
positive actually has 
colorectal cancer? A re- 
statement of the same 
problem in terms of 
percentage of cor- 
1. Select a population 
and use the base rate to 
determine how many 
people in the population 
have the disease. 
2. Take that result and 
use the test's sensitivity 
to determine how many 
people have the disease 
and a positive test. 
3. Take the remain- 
ing number of healthy 
people and use the 
test's false-positive rate 
to determine how many 
people do not have the disease but still test 
positive. 
4. Compare the number obtained in 
step 2 with the sum of those obtained in 
steps 2 and 3 to determine how many peo- 
ple with a positive test actually have the disease. 
Natural frequencies facilitate infer- 
ences because they carry implicit informa- 
tion about base rates and reduce the num- 
",..statistics 
expressed as natural 
frequencies improve 
the statistical 
thinking of experts 
and nonexperts 
alike." 
natural frequencies would be that out of ev- 
ery 10,000 people, 30 have colorectal cancer. 
Of these, 15 will have a positive hemoccult 
test. Out of the remaining 9970 people with- 
out colorectal cancer, 300 will still test posi- 
tive. How many of those who test positive 
actually have colorectal cancer? 
Only 1 out of 24 physicians gave the 
correct answer when the statistical infor- 
mation was expressed in probabilities (7). 
When it was presented in natural frequen- 
cies, 16 out of 24 other physicians gave the 
ber of computations 
required to determine 
the positive predictive 
value of a test (8, 9, 
10). They also corre- 
spond to the way in 
which humans have 
experienced statistical 
information over most 
of their history. 
Applications in 
Medicine 
To illustrate the effect 
of natural frequencies, 
we asked 96 advanced 
medical students to 
solve four realistic di- 
agnostic tasks. Each participant worked 
on two probability and two frequency ver- 
sions; the order of representation format 
and which task was in which format was 
balanced (11). For each of the tasks, more 
participants correctly inferred the likeli- 
hood of having the disease given a posi- 
tive test when the statistics were com- 
municated as natural frequencies (Fig. 1). 
Other medical practitioners could also 
profit from representing statistical infor- 
mation in terms of natural frequencies. 
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Consider the statistics AIDS counselors 
must understand and communicate. In 
Germany, the prevalence of HIV in hetero- 
sexual men who are not in any known risk 
group is around 0.01%. The false-positive 
rate of the HIV test (in which one blood 
sample is subjected to multiple tests) is 
around 0.01%, and its sensitivity is around 
99.9% [exact estimates vary (12)]. To ex- 
plore how counselors 
actually communicate 
these risks, we sent a 
male, low-risk client 
to 20 German public. 
health centers to have 
20 HIV tests. During 
the mandatory pretest 
counseling, the client 
asked the counselor 
about the prevalence, 
sensitivity, false-posi- 
tive rate, and the 
chance that he actual- 
ly had the virus if the 
test were positive (13). 
Not a single counselor 
communicated the 
SCIENCE'S COMPASS 
as health organizations inform women in 
terms of probabilities and relative risk reduc- 
tion about the benefits and harms of screen- 
ing, a truly informed ecision is unlikely. 
Applications in Law Determinations of facts and verdicts in le- 
gal proceedings often depend on scientific 
evidence. The communication of statistics 
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Fig. 2. Interpreting statistics. Legal experts' percentage of correct infer- 
ences (left) and of guilty verdicts (right) in two criminal court case files. 
risks to the client in natural frequencies. 
Instead, they used probabilities and per- 
centages, and, in the majority of the coun- 
seling sessions, the information was ei- 
ther inconsistent or wrong. For instance, 
one counselor estimated the base rate and 
the false-positive rate to be around 0.1%, 
and the sensitivity to be 99.9%, and then 
stated that the client's probability of in- fection given a positive test is also 99.9% 
(applying steps 1 to 4 above to his esti- 
mates yields a probability of 50%). In 
fact, 15 out of the 20 counselors told this 
low-risk client that it is 99.9% or 100% 
certain that he has HIV if he tests positive 
(applying steps 1 to 4 to the numbers 
found in the literature yields an actual 
probability of 50%). 
Percentages can mislead in other-ways. For example, it may sound impressive to learn that mammography screening can re- 
duce the risk of breast cancer fatality in 
women by 25% [for 50- to 74-year-old wom- 
en (14)].- However, this percentage does not 
say anything about the actual frequencies. If 4 out of 1000 women without symptoms die of breast cancer within the next 10 years 
(15), the relative risk reduction of 25% 
means that 1 woman in 1000 women who 
undergo screening would be saved. A wom- 
an without symptoms is most likely not one of the 4 to whom the risk reduction applies, but one of the other 996 instead-and many of these women may suffer as a result from 
the screening. For instance, false-positives occur and, moreover, cancers that grow so 
slowly that they present little risk will be di- 
agnosed and unnecessarily treated. As long 
is as important to the making of legal deci- 
sions by judges, attorneys, forensic ex- 
perts, and jurors as it is to medical deci- 
sion-makers (16, 17). In considering the 
admissibility standards for scientific evi- 
dence, the U.S. Supreme Court has specif- 
ically indicated that courts need to consid- 
er "known or potential rate of error, and the existence and maintenance of stan- 
dards controlling the technique's opera- tion" (18). 
In a study conducted in Germany, we 
asked 27 professionals who would soon 
qualify as judges and 127 advanced law 
students to evaluate two criminal-court 
case files involving rape (19). In both cas- 
es, a DNA match was reported between a 
DNA sample from the defendant and one 
recovered from the victim. Aside from 
this evidence, there was little reason to 
suspect that the defendant was the perpe- 
trator. Expert testimony reported the fre- 
quency of the recovered DNA profile as 1 in 1,000,000 and then stated that it was 
practically certain that the analysis would 
show a match for a person who indeed had 
the DNA profile (in other words, sensitivi- 
ty = 100%). The expert also reported the 
rates of technical and human mishaps 
leading to false-positive results in labora- 
tory tests to be about 0.003 (20). 
When these statistics were expressed as 
probabilities, only 13% of the professionals 
and under 1% of the law students correctly 
inferred the probability that the defendant 
was actually the source of the trace. But when 
the identical statistics were stated as natural 
frequencies, 68% and 44% of these same par- 
ticipants made the correct inference (Fig. 2, 
left). The different ways of expressing the same statistical information altered the ver- 
dicts in each case. When the information was 
presented as probabilities, 45% of the profes- 
sionals and 55% of the students rendered a 
verdict of guilty, but only 32% and 33% did 
so when the same statistics were expressed as 
natural frequencies (Fig. 2, right). When ver- 
dicts hinge on statistical evidence, under- 
standing that evidence is crucial, and pursu- 
ing this simple method of fostering statistical 
insight could contribute to that goal (21, 22). 
Implications for Teaching The beneficial effects of natural frequen- 
cies on statistical reasoning in the studies 
reported above occurred without training or instruction. Systematic training in the 
use of natural frequencies can even help 
people to reason with probabilities. The 
key is to teach representations rather than 
rules-that is to teach people how to trans- 
late probabilities into natural frequencies, as shown in steps 1 to 4. Traditionally, 
however, students are instead taught how to plug probabilities into mathematical 
formulas such as Bayes's rule. 
Teaching representations rather than 
rules-and expressing statistical informa- 
tion in natural frequencies where ap- 
propriate-can help to foster the statistical 
reasoning needed to make sound decisions. 
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Continuing Research 
into GuLf War IlLness 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A LINK BETWEEN 
lasting health problems in some Vietnam 
veterans and wartime exposure to 2,3,7,8- 
tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (2,3,7,8- 
TCDD) in the defoliant Agent Orange. Mar- 
tin Enserink, in his News Focus article 
"Gulf War Illness: The Battle Continues" (2 
Feb., p. 812), omits this point in his review 
of postwar syndromes of the past. 
A U.S. Air Force C- 123 flies over South Viet- 
nam in 1966, spraying defoliants containing 
dioxins. 
The Agent Orange xample suggests that 
sustained research might yield imtportant in- 
formation on the cause of health effects ob- 
served in Gulf War veterans. A major re- 
search effort was initiated in response to 
health effects observed in people who had 
contact with Agent Orange in Vietnam. The 
Environmental Protection Agency and oth- 
ers built on this work and found that 2,3,7,8- 
TCDD and related compounds ("dioxins") 
may affect the health of people in the gener- 
al population (1). It is now feasible to avoid 
future health problems by preventing this 
pollution (2), and a global treaty seeking 
this goal is in the works (3). However, while 
Enserink reports scepticism regarding iden- 
tification of a cause of Gulf War Illness af- 
ter 10 years and $155 million spent on re- 
search, the research on dioxins spanned 
decades and cost more than $2 billion (4). 
Lacking mention of these findings fol- 
lowing the Vietnam War, Enserink's report 
appears overly pessimistic about the 
prospects for health research following the 
Gulf War. The concern is that we might 
lose opportunities to identify a new envi- 
ronmental exposure factor in order to to 
prevent recurrent problems, if we fail to 
continue use of present scientific tools. 
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I WISH TO TAKE ISSUE WITH THE DESCRIPTION I
Martin Enserink's New Focus article on Gulf 
War Illness (GWI) of our discovery (1, 2) of 
Mycoplasmafermentans in '40% of GWI pa- 
tients that "it is not clear whether M fernen- 
tans really causes disease." In fact, there are 
numerous peer-reviewed papers on this issue 
(reviewed in 3), and a patent supported by 
the U.S. Army has been issued entitled 
"Pathogenic Mycoplasma" (4). Studies of 
its pathogenic properties have been pub- 
lished by the Armed Forces Institute of 
Pathology showing that healthy monkeys in- 
jected with M fermentans developed achron- 
ic illness that progresses to become fatal (5). 
Also, civilian patients with similar symptoms 
also show high rates of infection (2, 6, 7). M 
fernentans fulfills almost all of the criteria of 
pathogenicity (8), including recovery on 
specific antibiotics (7). On the basis of this 
Letters to the Editor 
Letters (-300 words) discuss material published 
in Science in the previous 6 months or issues 
of general interest. They can be submitted by 
e-mail (science_letters@aaas.org), the Web 
(www.letter2science.org), or regular mail 
(1200 New York Ave., NW, Washington, DC 
20005, USA). Letters are not acknowledged 
upon receipt, nor are authors generally con- 
sulted before publication. Whether published 
in full or in part, letters are subject to editing 
for clarity and space. 
information the Department of Veterans Af- 
fairs established Cooperative Clinical Study 
Program #475, a blinded, placebo-con- 
trolled study on the effects of antibiotic 
treatment on GWI patients with M fermen- 
tans infections. Although the clinical results 
of this study are not yet available, the labo- 
ratory entry criteria to the study indicate 
that a high percentage of GWI patients have 
systemic M fermentans infections. 
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Statistics: 
What Seems Natural? 
WHICH STATISTICAL DATA SEEM EASIER TO 
understand, 10 cases in 100, or 10%? In 
their Policy Forum "Communicating sta- 
tistical information" (Science's Compass, 
22 Dec., p. 2261), U. Hoffrage and col- 
leagues offer persuasive evidence that 
both experts and novices find it to be the 
former. When prevalence, sensitivity, and 
false positive rates are given as probabili- 
ties (e.g., 10%), most physicians misinter- 
pret the information in a way that could 
be potentially disastrous for the patient, 
but when they are presented as "natural 
frequencies" (e.g., 10 cases in 100), the 
physicians' performance is dramatically 
better. The authors suggest ways to im- 
prove both communication of statistical 
information and medical education by us- 
ing frequencies rather than probabilities. 
The discussion by Hoffrage et al. leaves 
open the question as to why this is the 
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suggest that "humans eem to be develop- 
mentally and evolutionarily prepared to 
handle natural frequencies" (1, p. 430) by 
accumulating examples of the category in 
question. However, this would not, in itself, 
explain why this accumulation is preferen- 
tially represented as frequencies rather than 
being transformed into some other repre- 
sentation, such as rate or probability. 
Frequencies (e.g., 10 cases in 100) can 
be thought of as a subcollection (with a nu- 
merosity of 10) in a collection (with a nu- 
merosity of 100). I have suggested that we 
are bom with a specialized capacity for rep- 
resenting collections and their numerosities 
(2). The evidence for this comes from a 
range of studies showing that infants, even in 
the first week of life, are sensitive to changes 
in the numerosity of a collection of visual 
objects (3) and that, at 6 months, they are 
able to form arithmetical expectations on the 
basis of adding an object to a collection or 
taking it away (4). The almost universal use 
of fingers as the representative collection in 
counting and arithmetic suggests that collec- 
tions and numerosities form the basis of later 
representations also (2). This suggestion has 
been supported by recent brain-imaging evi- 
dence showing that key number areas are 
closely connected to the finger circuit in the 
intraparietal sulci (5). 
Of course, the big developmental gap 
between the capacities of young children 
and the performance of adult decision- 
makers is typically filled by an education 
system that teaches children about collec- 
"lW]e are born 






tions and numerosities far more than about 
probability. It is thus plausible that educa- 
tional practices are, in part, responsible for 
the biases Hoffrage et al. report. However, 
there is indirect evidence that probability 
concepts are intrinsically difficult for hu- 
mans. Although the computational tech- 
niques required by probabilities of the type 
described by the authors would have been 
available to the ancient Greeks, an under- 
standing of the concepts began only with 
Girolamo Cardano's Liber de ludo aleae 
(1525, published in 1663) and in the corre- 
spondence between Pascal and Fermat 
about games of chance in 1654. 
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Response 
BUTTERWORTH SUGGESTS THAT NATURAL 
frequencies facilitate reasoning because 
people are born with a specialized capacity 
for processing collections of discrete ob- 
jects, rather than probabilities and frac- 
tions. There is certainly evolutionary and 
developmental evidence supporting this ex- 
planation, but there is also a second, more 
specific reason: Bayesian computations are 
simpler when information is represented in 
natural frequencies than in probabilities, 
percentages, or relative frequencies (1, 2). 
With natural frequencies, people can cal- 
culate the conditional probability of a hy- 
pothesis H (e.g., the occurrence of cancer) 
given data D (e.g., a positive test) simply: 
p(HID) = a/(a + b) (1) 
where a is the natural frequency of people 
with cancer who tested positive and b is 
that of people without cancer who tested 
positive. In the colorectoral cancer exam- 
ple used in our Policy Forum, a equals 15 
and b equals 300 people, respectively. 
Communicated this way, it is easy to see 
that 15 out of the 315 people who tested 
positive actually have cancer. In contrast, 
when the same information is communi- 
cated in terms of conditional probabilities, 
as is common practice, the calculation is 
complicated: 
p(HID) = p(H)p(DJH)/p(H)p(DJH) + 
p(-H)p (DI-H) 
(2) 
Equation 2 is known as Bayes' rule. In 
our example, applying this rule would re- 
quire the nontrivial computation 
(0.003)(0.5)/[(0.03)(0.5) + (0.997)(0.03)]. 
The reason why natural frequencies facilitate 
Bayesian inference is because they retain in- 
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formation about base rates (e.g., of cancer), 
whereas conditional probabilities are normal- 
ized with respect to these base rates. As a 
consequence, the probabilities in Eq. 2 (0.5 
and 0.03) need to be mulfiplied by the base 
rates (0.003 and 0.997) in order to reintro- 
duce base rate information. In other words, 
natural frequencies facilitate Bayesian rea- 
soning because part of the calculation is al- 
ready "done" witiin the representation itself. 
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The Bioenergetics 
of the Immune System 
NUTRIENT CONSERVATION AT TIMES OF 
starvation is an important survival trait for 
any organism. This principle is elegantly 
demonstrated in the Report entitled "Sur- 
vival for immunity: The price of immune 
system activation for bumblebee workers" 
by Yannick Moret and Paul Schmid- 
Hempel (10 Nov., p. 1166), in which the 
survival of bumblebees was significantly 
impaired by their inability to perform this 
function. Activation of the innate immune 
system of these insects caused increased 
mortality only when their nutrient intake 
was limited. The most likely cause of this 
increased mortality was the energy de- 
mands imposed by the immune response in 
the context of a paucity of energy substrate. 
In mammals, it has been shown that the 
adipocyte-derived hormone leptin is a reg- 
ulator of metabolism and bodyweight (1). 
An important physiological role of leptin 
is as a signal of starvation, in that a falling 
serum leptin concentration leads to neuro- 
humoral and behavioral changes that seek 
to preserve limited energy reserves for im- 
mediately vital functions (2). It has been 
proposed that reduced leptin levels during 
conditions of starvation lead to impaired 
reproductive, thermogenic (2), and im- 
mune capabilities (3). One of the key fea- 
tures of the innate immune response is 
that its response is the same on each sub- 
sequent exposure to a certain stimulus, 
whereas the cognate immune system 
shows markedly different responses upon 
subsequent reexposure to a particular anti- 
gen. Indeed, the cognate immune response 
is far more energy-expensive than the in- 
Bumblebees pay a hidden survival cost 
when their immune system is activated. 
nate response, because of the necessity 
for the large-scale antigen-specific clonal 
expansion of lymphocytes. 
The data presented by Moret and Schid- 
Hemple suggest that down-regulation of the 
immune response observed during starva- 
tion is an adaptive process, preserving vital 
energy supplies for cardiac and cerebral 
metabolism and hence the survival of the 
organism. We would propose that a falling 
leptin concentration during starvation caus- 
es a much-reduced cognate immune re- 
sponse. To date, leptin expression has been 
detected as far back in the evolutionary tree 
as ectotherms (4). It is interesting to note 
that it is at this stage of evolution that a cog- 
nate immune system emerged, with its in- 
trinsic energy-expensive r quirements. 
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Response 
SEVERAL OF THE THEORETICAL ND EMPIRICAL 
points that Lord and colleagues touch on 
deserve further elucidation. For example, 
they refer to down-regulation of the im- 
mune defense under stressful conditions. 
This has not only been suggested for hu- 
mans, performing excessive physical exer- 
cise (1), but has been experimentally 
demonstrated, for example, with birds 
forced to increase parental effort (2), or 
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